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Congress Elects a President: Henry Clay and 
the Campaign of 1824 
Albert D. Kirwan 
Introduction 
The political and electoral problems treated in the late Albert D. 
Kirwan's paper, which was originally presented as the Distinguished 
Professor Lecture of the College of Arts and Sciences at the 
University of Kentucky in 1968, are firmly, perhaps permanently 
rooted in the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States . That amendment was a rather clumsy attempt to improve 
on the language and intent of Article II, Section 1, Paragraph 2 of 
the original document-or that part of it which fashioned the 
machinery for electing presidents . Failing to anticipate the 
emergence of political parties in America, and fearful of the threat 
of too much direct democracy in the new United States, the 
Founding Fathers in 1787 created an Electoral College whose 
members would 
vote by ballot for two persons .... The person having the 
greatest number of votes shall be the President, if such 
number be a majority of the whole numbers of Electors 
appointed; and if there shall be more than one who have such 
a majority , and have an equal number of votes, the House of 
Representatives shall immediately chuse by ballot one of them 
for President. ... But in chusing the President, the votes shall 
be taken by State, the representation [in Congress] from each 
State having one vote . ... after the choice of the President, 
the person having the greatest number of votes of the Electors 
shall be the Vice President. 
This arrangement broke down completely in 1800 when 
Democrat-Republicans Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr both 
received seventy-three electoral votes for president. The election 
was thus thrown into the House of Representatives even though the 
tie was between candidates of the same party. Indeed, it took 
3 
thirty-six ballots and considerable wheeling and dealing to resolve 
the mess. 
To prevent this from happening again, and in recognition of the 
fact that by 1800 a distinct party system had emerged in the infant 
United States, the Twelfth Amendment was adopted in 1804. It 
provided that members of the Electoral College 
shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, 
and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice President. 
... If no person have such majority, then from the persons 
having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of 
those voted for as President, the House of Representatives 
shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in 
choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States. 
If, then, in a close presidential campaign-one with three or 
more parties or factions in the field-the Electoral College cannot 
produce a majority for any candidate, the election goes to the 
House. There the unit-vote provision ("the votes shall be taken by 
States") comes into play . Under this wholly undemocratic rubric the 
House delegation of each state collectively casts one vote. In 
contemporary terms, this means that Delaware with a state 
delegation of one representative has the same power in choosing a 
president as does California with 43 representatives or New York 
with 39. Indeed, it has been calculated that the five smallest states 
in the Union, having a total of 2 .8 million people and 5 
representatives, would have as much power today in the House 
selection of a president as would the five largest states, having a 
total of 78.8 million people and 155 representatives. 
Such is the potential menace of the Twelfth Amendment, a 
menace first fully appreciated during the wild and woolly election 
of 1824. Put succinctly, the Twelfth Amendment was tested in the 
House of Representatives in February 1825, and, in the opinion of 
many, was found wanting. Andrew Jackson led the four candidates 
with 43.5% of the popular vote and ninety-nine electoral votes. He 
failed, however, to command a majority in the Electoral College 
and the election went to the House. There, thanks to Henry Clay 
and the unit-vote provision, John Quincy Adams was elected sixth 
president of the United States, although he had garnered but 30.5% 
of the popular vote and eighty-four electoral votes in the November 
1824 canvass. True, he had run a strong second in the election; but 
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second is still second . 
The whys, hows, and wherefores of this dramatic event in 
American political history, particularly the controversial role 
played by Henry Clay in promoting the election of Adams, are the 
subjects of Professor Kirwan's instructive paper, an address· 
presented on 8 October 1968, on the eve of the presidential election 
of that year. That particular election, it will be recalled, was the 
one during which George Wallace, leader of the American 
Independent party, made it quite clear that a primary goal of his 
candidacy was to throw the Richard Nixon vs. Hubert Humphrey 
election into the House. There, he threatened, he would extract 
concessions from both major parties on integration, busing, states' 
rights, the rights of radicals, and civil rights in general. Fortunately 
Wallace's strategy failed. Still , the Twelfth Amendment is tailor-
made for the political blackmail, bargaining, and banditry 
envisioned by the Alabama politician . 
Given the time and circumstances, considerable attention was 
paid to the disruptive Wallace candidacy in the 1968 version of 
Professor Kirwan's paper. This material has been edited out. 
Stylistic and semantic changes for the printed page have been made 
in the text of the oral presentation, and Dr. Kirwan's original notes 
have been extensively reworked . All of the 1825 Clay 
correspondence he cited in 1968 has since been printed, in Volume 4 
(1972) of James F. Hopkins and Mary W.M. Hargreaves, eds., The 
Papers of Henry Clay, 7 vols . to date, (Lexington: University Press 
of Kentucky, 1959-). Other Clay materials mentioned may be 
consulted in the relevant printed volumes or, if not printed, in the 
offices of the Clay Papers Project in the M.I. King Library, 
University of Kentucky. 
Robert Seager II, Professor of History, and Editor, The Papers of 
Henry Clay, University of Kentucky . 
5 HENRY CLAY 
The Alfred M. Hoffy portrait of Clay in the Gallery of M.l. King Library, 
University of Kentucky 
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A major problem in the 1824 campaign was that the excellent start 
toward a workable two-party system begun by Jefferson and 
Hamilton a quarter-century before had faded away. The Federalist 
party had destroyed itself by taking an unpatriotic posture during 
the War of 1812, and Democrat-Republican James Monroe, the fifth 
president, was overwhelmingly elected over Federalist Rufus King in 
1816. Four years later he was almost unanimously reelected when 
the Federalist party failed even to nominate a candidate. The two-
party system had broken down completely. On the other hand, the 
two-term tradition was well established. It would thus be necessary 
to choose a new person as chief executive in November 1824. 
In that year there were no fewer than five candidates, all calling 
themselves "Republicans. " John C. Calhoun (South Carolina) 
withdrew seven months before the election. This left John Quincy 
Adams (Massachusetts), Henry Clay (Kentucky) , William H. 
Crawford (Georgia), and Andrew Jackson (Tennessee) in the lists. 
At the same time, there was growing dissatisfaction with the 
presidential nominating process, and there were numerous highly 
emotional and distinctly sectional issues that cut across class lines. 
These included the slavery, tariff, national bank, and internal 
improvements questions. 
There were also strong sectional jealousies that had to be taken 
into account in making a choice for president in 1824. Virginia, 
representing the Upper South, had monopolized the executive office 
for all but one term since the founding of the republic thirty-six 
years earlier. New England resented the fact that only one of her 
sons, John Adams, had ever been chief magistrate. The Middle 
Atlantic states, headed by powerful New York and Pennsylvania, 
resented even more that their section had never been so honored. 
And by the 1820s, a new region, the West, was growing rapidly; it 
too had developed presidential ambitions. "You may confidently 
believe in an entire union of the West in favor of some western 
candidate," Henry Clay had written in December 1821. 1 The contest 
began immediately after the election of 1820, even earlier if John 
Quincy Adams's view of the matter be taken at face value. 2 
7 HENRY CLAY 
At the outset the leading candidate was unquestionably William 
H. Crawford. All but forgotten now, Crawford was one of the 
most distinguished Americans of his generation. A Virginia-born 
Georgian, he was extremely popular in the South Atlantic region. A 
defender of the status quo and of states' rights, he was affable, 
studious, and sagacious. He had a handsome face atop a body of 
heroic proportions. He was a man early marked for distinction. 
Elected to the United States Senate in 1807, when he was barely 
thirty-five, he was in the next eight years successively chosen 
president pro tern of the Senate, secretary of war, minister to 
France, and secretary of the treasury. So prominent was he that 
when it came time for the Republicans to nominate a successor to 
Madison in 1816 many urged him to challenge secretary of state 
James Monroe, then regarded as Madison's crown prince. 
Crawford, however, refused to push his own candidacy. Even 
so, he received fifty-four votes to Monroe's sixty-five in the 
congressional caucus of 16 March 1815. His modest self-denial thus 
earned him the gratitude of Monroe and the universal respect of the 
old Republican leaders. President Monroe, therefore, continued him 
in his office as secretary of the treasury , and the Republican elders, 
by common agreement, looked to him as Monroe's successor in 
1824. But long before that date new and younger leaders had been 
brought forward by the political turbulence created by the War of 
1812 and its settlement at Ghent in December 1814, and some of 
them now prepared to challenge the old order of leadership whose 
anointed leader Crawford was. 
In Monroe's cabinet as a colleague of Crawford was secretary of 
state John Quincy Adams, fifty-seven-year-old Harvard graduate 
with an impressive family and personal background. At the age of 
eleven he had accompanied his father John Adams on a diplomatic 
mission to France during the American Revolution; at the age of 
fourteen he was secretary to the American minister at St. 
Petersburg; at twenty-six he became American minister to the 
Netherlands. Along with Henry Clay and three others he negotiated 
the Treaty of Ghent in 1814. During those negotiations Adams and 
Clay developed wary respect for one another, but little real 
affection. Differing in temperament and interests, they clashed over 
personal as well as policy matters. Clay's fondness for wine, cards, 
and late hours irritated the dour Puritan from Quincy. More to the 
point, Adams's willingness to cede to the British free use of the 
Mississippi River in exchange for fishing privileges for New England 
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seamen on the Newfoundland banks brought on a clash with Clay 
that precipitated a crisis within the American delegation. 
Adams's subsequent appointment to the state department by 
Monroe further antagonized the Kentuckian, who thought his own 
claim to the office superior. But as secretary of state, Adams would 
cap a remarkable diplomatic career by negotiating the acquisition of 
Florida and by serving as chief architect of the policy that became 
known as the Monroe Doctrine. 
But for all his accomplishments and for all his learning, which 
was prodigious, Adams simply did not look the part of a president. 
Bald of pate and round of body, his physical appearance did small 
justice to his mental and moral powers. "His head glistened too 
much like a Sun Dial [and] he had neither the manners nor the 
appearance of a gentleman, " wrote one who met him for the first 
time. Besides, he had a cold exterior, acid tongue and pen, and a 
suspicious mind, bordering almost on paranoia, that turned 
potential friends into enemies. Yet, as secretary of state he was by 
tradition a prime candidate for the presidency. 3 
A second challenger to Crawford was Henry Clay, Kentucky 
orator and congressional leader without peer in his day. So great 
was the reputation that preceded him that he was chosen Speaker 
of the House of Representatives on his first appearance in that body 
in 1811 . As leader of the War Hawks, he probably was more 
responsible for bringing on a declaration of war in 1812 than any 
other man. Returning from Europe in 1815, he declined offers to 
serve as U.S. minister to London or to become secretary of war. 
(He was passed over for the post of secretary of state.) Tall, 
angular, graceful of movement, he possessed a charm for both men 
and women that was almost irresistible. Supremely confident of his 
own powers, sometimes to the point of arrogance, he developed an 
ambition for the presidency that would never be gratified but which 
would never cease to haunt and possess him . Throughout the 
administration of Monroe, he assumed the role of leader of the 
opposition in Congress, a role that drew bitter comments from the 
secretary of state. "In politics as in private life," wrote Adams, 
"Clay is essentially a gambler." He conceded that Clay was 
eloquent, but sneered that he was "only half educated."4 
Last of Crawford's challengers, the one whose candidacy was not 
taken seriously by the other candidates until his Pennsylvania 
friends completely overwhelmed those of John C. Calhoun at the 
Harrisburg state nominating convention in March 1824, was 
9 HENRY CLAY 
Andrew Jackson, Tennessee Indian fighter and hero of the Battle of 
New Orleans. Thin in body, long of face, he had deveioped in early 
life remarkable powers of will. Hot-tempered, loyal, vindictive, he 
was a man of instinctive likes and dislikes. His devotion to his 
much-abused wife Rachel has become legend. He killed one man in 
a duel for casting reflections on her virtue, and there was more 
than an implied promise on his part to deal in similar manner with 
others who might make the same miscalculation. In contrast to 
Crawford, Adams, and Clay, he had almost no experience in civil 
affairs. But he had emerged from the War of 1812 as the nation's 
greatest military hero since Washington. For this reason shrewd 
Tennessee politicians soon began grooming him for the presidency. 
"The people are fascinated and influenced by the splendour of his 
military fame alone," wrote a jealous political opponent. "[He] has 
slain the Indians and flogged the British and spilled his blood in 
defense of his country's rights-therefore he is the bravest, wisest 
and greatest man in the nation-even the memory of Washington is 
lost in the glare of his bloody laurels."5 
Even Adams had kinder words for Andrew Jackson than he had 
for most of his political opponents. He thought Jackson honest as 
well as "fit by name and character at least for the Vice Presidency," 
an office which would afford him "an easy and dignified retirement 
for his old age."6 At the time of this condescending assessment 
Jackson was fifty-seven, just a few months older than Adams 
himself. With little tact, with an irascible and sometimes impetuous 
nature, but with leonine courage, Old Hickory was more of a 
commander than a leader. He was destined to become one of 
America's historic political figures. Further, he would soon become 
identified with the cause of the "common man," a new force at the 
time boiling to the surface in America. Up until this period in his 
life, however, he had been identified with the conservative element 
in Tennessee politics; and he also had a somewhat unsavory 
reputation as a land speculator and as a merchant who did not 
hesitate to make profits from the trade in slaves. 
With the starting gate filled to overflowing in 1824, with the 
Federalist party dead, and with nomination by the Democratic-
Republican party tantamount to election, interest naturally centered 
on the nominating process itself. It was a day when the national 
party convention with all its circus trappings had not yet evolved. 
Instead, a process whereby party members in Congress gathered in 
caucus to choose a candidate had long been in use. It was by this 
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method that Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe had earlier been 
chosen by the Republicans; and John Adams, Charles C. Pinckney, 
and Rufus King by the Federalists. 
To be sure, there was a growing discontent with the caucus 
approach by 1824. How much of it can be traced to the geimine 
concern of the common man clamoring to have a voice in making 
decisions that affected his life and fortune, and how much of it was 
related to the dissatisfaction of ambitious men rising to challenge 
the tight control wielded by the party elders, is impossible to say. 
But all dissidents joined in denouncing the congressional caucus as 
undemocratic. The voiceless common man, it was said-and this 
was true-had no part in choosing a president except to vote for 
electors who would vote for a candidate already selected by a 
caucus of "party robots" in Washington, men far removed from the 
mainstream of popular sentiment. Indeed, in seven of the then 
twenty-four states, even the privilege of directly choosing 
presidential electors was denied the voter; in those states they were 
chosen by the legislatures. 
Thus it was that the congressional caucus, which had served the 
country well, was increasingly denounced as the last vestige of a 
dying aristocratic system. It was cited, for instance, as the reason 
for the great political apathy shown in the presidential election of 
1820. In that election, for example, Kentucky, with half a million 
people, cast fewer than 8,000 votes. Virginia, with twice Kentucky's 
population, counted barely 4,000 votes that year. Only 17 votes 
were cast in the city of Richmond, Virginia, and only 750 in the 
entire state of Mississippi. 7 
Since William H. Crawford was the favorite of the conservative 
wing of the old Republican party and since the nomination of its 
caucus in Congress had all but been promised him eight years 
before, it was only natural that the other candidates would attack 
"King Caucus, " seizing upon the rising democratic ferment to 
discredit it. By the autumn of 1823 their efforts had been so 
successful that only three states, Georgia, Virginia, and New 
York-states where Crawford had his strongest following-
continued to urge the calling of a congressional nominating caucus. 
In late January 1824, only a few weeks before the prescribed date 
for that caucus, Clay was confident there would be none. A 
"general" caucus, he said, could not be held because many 
congressmen would not attend while others had been "instructed" 
by their legislatures not to attend. This situation, Clay held, had 
11 HENRY CLAY 
thrown Crawford's congressional supporters into "the greatest 
confusion and despondency ."8 -
Meanwhile, Crawford had suffered a paralytic stroke in the 
autumn of 1823 . At first his life was despaired of, but by late 
winter he showed signs of recovery. Had he withdrawn from the 
race, it is quite likely that Clay instead of Adams would have been 
the sixth president. But Crawford's friends stubbornly refused to 
withdraw him . Grasping at any semblance of organized support to 
sustain his cause, they resolved to force his nomination by a caucus 
in Washington. 
Accordingly, on 7 February 1824, the Washington Daily 
National Intelligencer carried two announcements. The first , signed 
by Crawford's supporters, called for a caucus to meet on 14 
February. The second, issued by the congressional friends of the 
other three candidates, stated that 181 of the 261 members of 
Congress had agreed that it was "inexpedient" to proceed with a 
caucus nomination . In spite of the second announcement, and after 
much "persuasion, threats, coaxing, entreaties," 66 members, barely 
a fourth of the total number of congressmen, met on 14 February 
and dutifully nominated William H. Crawford .9 Of the 66, it was 
- estimated that 22 were from states whose legislatures had already 
declared for other candidates. It would be the last time that the 
nominating caucus would be held in Congress. 
Having failed in their efforts to prevent a caucus nomination, 
Crawford's opponents now had to find new avenues to get their 
names before the public. Several ways presented themselves: 
nomination by newspapers, nomination by mass meetings called for 
that purpose, or nomination by a state legislature. This last seemed 
to avoid the odium associated with congressional caucus 
nominations because members of state legislatures were presumed 
to be politically closer to the people and therefore were thought to 
be more closely associated with popular wishes. At the same time, 
it was a relatively easy matter for a candidate to win the backing of 
his own state legislature and perhaps that of neighboring states. 
Thus, Calhoun, before he withdrew, was nominated by the South 
Carolina legislature, Jackson by that of Tennessee, and Clay by 
those of Kentucky, Missouri, and Ohio . Adams had been 
nominated by most of the New England states. 10 
As the campaign developed, real as well as artificial issues arose . 
Positions of candidates on measures long past were exhumed and 
scrutinized for vulnerable points. How had this or that candidate 
12 THE KENTUCKY REVIEW 
stood on Jefferson's embargo of 1807, the 1812 war, the Bank of the 
United States, the tariff, the Missouri Compromise question, or the 
Treaty of Ghent? Adams was attacked (covertly but ineffectively) 
by Clay for his willingness (at Ghent) to surrender the right of 
navigation on the Mississippi to the British. He was also denounced 
for having negotiated (while secretary of state) a treaty with Great 
Britain giving her war vessels the right to stop and search American 
merchant vessels on the high seas in an effort to suppress the 
African slave trade. The Bank of the United States was unpopular 
in many places because of what some thought was its unnecessarily 
hard anti-debtor line following the Panic of 1819; and Clay, as an 
attorney for the bank, was abused for the part he had played for 
his client. Slavery was in its incipient stage as a political issue, and 
Clay's role in gaining Missouri's admission as a slave state was 
probably a major factor in his failure to win strong support in any 
of the free states except Ohio. Jackson's summary execution of 
American militiamen during the Creek War, as well as his invasion 
of Spanish Florida and his arbitrary execution of two British 
citizens there in 1818, were made issues against him. 
After Calhoun's withdrawal from the race, Clay was the only 
candidate who had anything that could be called a comprehensive 
political program. And it was this program, or at least parts of it, 
that raised the principal constitutional issues in the campaign . Clay 
had tied together the protective tariff, internal improvements 
financed by the federal government, and a sound currency based on 
a national bank into a neat, comprehensive package which he 
dubbed "The American System." 
Objections to it were many: the protective tariff took money 
from farmers and planters and put it in the pockets of favored 
manufacturers; the national government had not the right, nor was 
it good policy, to construct roads or canals within the boundaries 
of a state; the national bank was a privately owned monopoly 
which created hardship for the people and for small business (in 
ways not made clear). Opponents of all three measures were in the 
minority; unable to prevent the passage of these measures in 
Congress, they fell back on the old Jeffersonian doctrine of states' 
rights and narrow construction of the Constitution. 
But Clay's views on these controversial measures had been 
developed thoughtfully, and he was not to be routed from his 
position by such talk. The country, he reasoned, produced an 
immense surplus of agricultural staples for which there was no 
13 HENRY CLAY 
market at home or abroad. On the other hand, most of its 
consumption of fabricated products were of foreign-produced items. 
Agriculture and manufacturing must, therefore, be brought into 
balance . "Some of us must cultivate," he said, "some fabricate." 
Infant American manufacturers, he held, could not survive against 
foreign competition without a subsidy, an indirect subsidy in the 
form of tariff duties added to the price of imports. He was 
unpersuaded by arguments that such a tax was for the sole benefit 
of the manufacturing class. It was, on the contrary, for the "general 
welfare." 
As for internal improvements, such as roads and canals, he said 
it was as constitutional for the national government to build these 
for the promotion of domestic commerce as it was to build a navy 
to protect foreign trade. Both were "vital interests" of different 
regions of the country, and if they were not furnished by the 
national government the Union could not be held together. 
Clay well knew that his liberal constitutional views were 
unpopular in some places, nowhere more so than in his native 
Virginia; but he refused to consider urgings of his Virginia friends 
to soften his position to win the Old Dominion's electoral vote in 
1824. "My opinion, " he wrote, "has been formed after much 
deliberation and my best judgment yet tells me that I am right." He 
reconciled himself to the loss of Virginia, knowing that the anti-
tariff hostility toward him there was not entirely balanced by 
support for him in states like Pennsylvania where the tariff was 
popular. 11 
At least a year before the election it had become clear that the 
electoral vote would be so divided among the several candidates 
that no one of them was likely to secure a majority. In such a case 
the Constitution provided (then as now) that the House of 
Representatives should choose the president from the three 
candidates with the largest electoral vote. Since one of the four 
candidates in 1824 would thus be eliminated by the electoral college 
vote, each of them aimed at making certain that he be listed among 
the top three. 
Crawford, despite his precarious health, was still in the race and 
was assured of the thirty-three votes of Virginia and Georgia. He 
had a strong following, too, in New York, where the leader of the 
"Albany Regency," Martin Van Buren (the "Little Magician"), was 
his champion. If Crawford could win even a part of the New York 
electoral vote his might well be among the three names submitted 
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actually emerge victorious there. 
New York was equally important for Clay and Adams, for if all 
its thirty-six electoral votes should be captured by either of them it 
would likely exclude the other from final consideration in the 
House . Without New York, Adams could count only the fifty-one 
votes of the New England states. Clay hoped to get the forty-five 
votes of Kentucky, Missouri , and the three northwestern states of 
Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois .U Accordingly, New York became the 
pivotal state in the contest. If Clay, for instance, should capture 
enough of her electoral vote to be among the final three, his great 
popularity in the House, where he had just recently won reelection 
as Speaker by an all but unanimous vote, would give him 
additional advantage there . "If I get into the House," he wrote in 
January 1824, "I consider my election secure."13 
But New York, aside from being the pivotal state, was also the 
most politically uncertain and unpredictable of all the twenty-four 
states then in the Union. In no other state was there such a 
diversity of interest among its citizens as existed between the masses 
of the already great city. at the mouth of the Hudson and the 
scattered rural population upstate . Furthermore, rivalry between 
Republican party factions headed by Van Buren and DeWitt 
Clinton created the image of a chaotic as well as corrupt political 
structure. "One can scarcely write anything relating to our State," 
wrote a New Yorker six weeks before the election, "which can 
honor our political character abroad. The profligacy of the times, 
the thirst for public office and emolument and the unwearied and 
artful [sic] efforts to corrupt and purchase others have truly sunk 
our State in public estimation ." Even Governor Clinton was 
reported to have admitted that his state could be "bought with 
money for any purpose and by any purchaser-even a foreign 
power."14 
New York was also one of the states whose presidential electors 
would be chosen by her legislature rather than by popular vote. 
This, too, seemed to be to Clay's advan tage. For while he could not 
hope to get a plurality of the popular vote in the state, his 
supporters in the state legislature held the balance between the 
evenly divided forces of Adams and Crawford there; and neither of 
the others could win without help from Clay's friends. In this 
atmosphere, intrigue and conspiracy seemed to be the order of the 
day in all camps except Jackson's, whose New York following was 
15 HENRY CLAY 
so small that he had no bargaining power. Clay's manager, Senator 
Josiah S. Johnston of Louisiana, hinted at "intrigues and 
combinations of things not to be lettered. " Indeed, rumors were 
circulated of arrangements among Crawford and Adams leaders to 
divide the vote, and it was alleged at various times that Crawford 
or Clay had withdrawn from the race. 
Finally, in late summer, a bargain was struck between Clay's and 
Adams's friends to divide the thirty-six electoral vo tes of New York 
equally between their candidates. Although warned that he might 
be betrayed in this arrangement by Adams's followers, Clay gave 
his reluctant consent to it. This decision would tarnish somewhat 
his later claim that throughout the contest he had abstained "from 
every species" of compromise, rejected "every overture looking to 
arrangements." But as Clay rationalized the situation to his friend, 
Peter B. Porter, in mid-February 1824, "If there be a majority of the 
legislature who prefer either of two candidates to a third, there is 
much reason in an equal division of its vote between those two ." "I 
pray you," he added in a postscript, "throw this note into the 
fire."15 
While the results of the November election would surprise many 
people, they crushed Clay's hopes. Jackson led all four candidates 
with ninety-nine electoral votes, Adams was second with eighty-
four, Crawford was third with forty-one, and Clay finished last 
with thirty-seven. Clay was played false in New York, where he 
received only four instead of the agreed-on eighteen electoral votes; 
but he failed also to carry Indiana or Illinois, both of which went 
overwhelmingly for Jackson . Ohio went for him by the narrow 
margin of only seven hundred popular votes. 
But it was in Louisiana that fate dealt Clay the cruelest blow. In 
that state the legislature chose presidential electors. Two of Clay's 
supporters, en route to the session that would choose those electors, 
were injured when their carriage overturned and did not attend. 
Two others on whom Clay had counted also failed to attend. In the 
absence of these four, two more who were pledged to him "were 
seduced ." Even so, a coalition of Jackson and Adams supporters in 
the legislature carried the election against Clay's people by only two 
votes, thirty to twenty-eight. They then gave three electoral votes 
to Jackson and two to Adams. Had misfortune not thus dogged 
him, Clay would have won Louisiana's five electoral votes and 
would have replaced Crawford in the list of three eligible 
candidates in the House election. As he wrote his brother-in-law, 
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James Brown, "accident alone prevented my return to the H[ouse] 
of R[epresentatives] and, as is generally now believed, my 
election. "16 
With Clay out of contention in the election now to be decided in 
the House of Representa tives, he naturally occupied a position of 
great influence. As Speaker of the House he explained his situation 
to Francis P. Blair: 
I am sometimes touched gently on the shoulder by a friend 
.. . of Genera l Jackson who will thus address me, 'My dear 
sir, all my dependence is upon you, don't disappoint us , you 
know our partiality was for you next to the hero .. . .' 
Immediately after, a friend of Mr. Crawford will accost me, 
'The hopes of the Republican party are concentrated on you, 
for God's sake preserve it. If you had been returned, instead 
of Mr. Crawford, every man of us would have supported you 
to the last hour. We consider him and you the only genuine 
Republican candidates .' Next a friend of Mr. Adams comes 
with tears in his eyes. 'Sir, Mr. Adams has always had the 
greatest respect for you, and admiration for your talents . 
There is no station to which you are not equal. Most 
undoubtedly you are the second choice of New England, and I 
pray you to consider seriously whether the public good and 
your own future interests do not point most distinctly to the 
choice which you ought to make.' How [Clay concluded] can 
one stand all this disinterested homage and kindness? 17 
Still, there is no evidence that Clay relished the prospect of 
becoming kingmaker, especially since Crawford's physical 
incapacity necessarily limited his choice to Adams or Jackson . "And 
what an alternative that is!" he wrote. He saw strong objections to 
both of them and only wished " that I could have been spared such 
a painful duty. " Nevertheless, he would act, he said, "without the 
slightest reference to personal consideration. "18 
Actually, there was little doubt in Clay's mind that he must vote 
for Adams even though Jackson was clearly the choice of Kentucky 
once Clay himself was eliminated. After all, Jackson was almost 
wholly without experience in civil affairs, his fame resting solely on 
his military victories against the Indians and the British. "I cannot 
believe," Clay wrote Blair, " that the killing [of] 2500 Englishmen at 
New Orleans qualifies [one] for the various, difficult and 
17 HENRY CLAY 
complicated duties of the Chief Magistrate ."19 Adams, on the other 
hand, had had more experience than Clay himself. Further, Adams, 
like Clay, entertained nationalistic views regarding the tariff and 
internal improvements, while Jackson's beliefs, if indeed he had 
formed any firm ones on these or other issues, were unknown. 
It is no reflection on Clay's patriotism to point out that his own 
political fortunes would also be advanced by an alliance with 
Adams. For Jackson's political strength was based in the West, just 
as was Clay's, and any union between them would add little to the 
strength of either . Adams, conversely, had a New England 
following which, allied with Clay's in the West, would unite two 
sections that together might successfully advance Clay's political 
fortunes at some future date. Adams's election "would be most 
propitious to your elevation four years hence," Peter B. Porter 
reminded Clay in mid-January 1825, adding that after Adams's term 
of office the country "would naturally look to the West for a 
successor. " Clay agreed: "I am happy to find that, by a similar 
train of reasoning, we have brought our minds to the same 
conclusion." 20 
If Clay let his mind linger on his own ambitions, certainly he did 
not go to Washington in December 1824 with any intention of 
bargaining. On the contrary, the evidence is convincing that from 
the time he learned that he had been eliminated from the contest he 
had firmly resolved to support Adams. In November he had told 
friends in Kentucky that he would; and on his arrival in 
Washington he told General Lafayette, who was visiting there, that 
he would. Indeed, Thomas Hart Benton, no friend of Clay's, 
recalled thirty years later that early in December 1824, long before 
there was any thought of a "corrupt bargain," Clay had told him 
that he would vote for John Quincy Adams. 21 
But if Clay and Adams are to be absolved of a conspiracy to 
defeat the will of the people, by preventing the election of Jackson, 
as was later charged, it must be said that their behavior in the 
matter, as well as that of Clay's friends, was most indiscreet. It was 
such as to arouse the suspicions of men less biased and less 
ambitious than were Jackson's followers . In early January 1825 
members of the Kentucky congressional delegation in Washington 
began writing Clay's friends in Frankfort, telling them that 
Kentucky would be best served by Adams's election. Their 
argument was that Clay would have a prominent role in an Adams 
administration, but none if Jackson were elected. Clay's friends 
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back home were also urged to write wavering members of the 
delegation in Washington and urge them to support Adams. Many 
of them did. Francis Preston Blair, for instance, who would later 
become a trusted member of Jackson's "Kitchen Cabinet" (although 
at this time he was still a confidant of Clay's) told Clay that when 
he learned that the congressman from his district felt bound to vote 
for Jackson, "both [John J .] Crittenden & myself therefore wrote 
him emancipating letters."22 
Much of this correspondence was not generally known late in 
1824 and would only be revealed in later years. More suspicious at 
the time was the growing intercourse in Washington between 
members of the Kentucky delegation (including Clay) with Adams 
himself. On 7 December Adams met with Richard M. Johnson; on 
9 December, with John T. Johnson and Thomas Metcalfe; the 
following day with Robert P. Letcher; the next with Charles A. 
Wickliffe. On 12 December Adams went to Fletcher's Boarding 
House and visited several Kentuckians who resided there; then he 
called on the Johnson brothers, and finally on Clay and Letcher, 
who boarded together. Letcher informed him, Adams recorded, of 
"convulsed" political conditions in Kentucky resulting from the Old 
Court vs. New Court controversy raging there. He intimated that 
he and others in the delegation would therefore not be bound by 
instructions from the Kentucky legislature for them to vote for 
Jackson. Three days later Adams heard rumors that Clay would 
support him "if he could at the same time be useful to himself." 23 
On 17 December Letcher called on Adams. They had a long 
conversation about the personal relations of Adams and Clay, 
which had been marred somewhat during the campaign. Each 
assured the other that there was now no hostility. Adams 
concluded that the substance of Letcher's remarks was "that if 
Clay's friends could know that he would have a prominent share in 
the administration, that might induce them to vote for me, even in 
the face of [legislative] instructions." Six days later, Letcher was 
again at Adams's house, enumerating for him the states that might 
be expected to vote for Adams on the first ballot. When Adams 
told him that he did not hope to get the vote of Kentucky, Letcher 
seemed anxious, Adams thought, "to convince me that I might 
receive it. I consider Letcher as moving for Mr. Clay," he recorded 
in his diary. 24 
On New Year's Day 1825 Letcher again sought out Adams to 
report that Clay's friends were still disturbed over the old enmity 
19 HENRY CLAY 
between Adams and Clay. He urged a meeting between them. Soon 
thereafter, Adams and Clay met at a public reception where Clay 
expressed a wish for a confidential talk on "public affairs." That 
night Adams recorded, "There is in my prospects and anticipations 
a solemnity and moment never before experienced." So it was that 
the two men met at Adams's house on 9 January 1825 and spent the 
evening together in what Adams described as discussions 
"explanatory of the past and prospective of the future." Clay 
explained that thus far he and his friends had maintained a neutral 
course so that they might ultimately take a stand "most conducive 
to the public interest." It was time now for a decision, however, 
and Clay wanted to satisfy himself as to "some principles of great 
public importance, but without any personal consideration for 
himself." He ended by telling Adams frankly that he preferred 
him. 25 
Meantime, John Scott, the lone representative from Missouri, a 
man who had been openly hostile to Adams, called on him and 
pledged his support. He also told Adams he was "entirely devoted 
to Mr. Clay" and hoped Clay "would be a member of the next 
administration." Adams replied that if he should be "elected by the 
suffrage of the West, I should naturally look to the West for much 
of the support that I should need." Scott departed, only to return 
the next day to express the hope that Adams would not consider his 
language of the day before as smacking of bargaining. Adams 
assured him he did not. Two days later, on 24 January, Clay and a 
majority of the Kentucky delegation announced publicly that they 
would vote for Adams. 26 
As the day set for the House election neared, tension mounted. 
The Jackson party was enraged to learn that despite 
recommendations to the contrary by the Kentucky state legislature, 
members of the Kentucky delegation would not support the general. 
Adams even received anonymous messages threatening civil war if 
Jackson were not elected. He was alarmed, too, over what he called 
the excessive "intriguing for votes," and he began to wonder if 
success might not bring "a severer trial than defeat."27 
On 9 February 1825 the House of Representatives assembled to 
choose the president. Twelve states were by now known to favor 
Adams; he needed one more for a unit-vote majority. New York 
was his only possibility. That state had thirty-four representatives 
present and voting, and its vote would be decided by the majority 
of the delegation. Seventeen of them (exactly half) were known to 
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favor Adams; the other half was divided, but most of them were 
for Crawford, a few for Jackson. 
General Stephen Van Rensselaer held the key to New York's 
decision. While he was thought to be pledged to Crawford, he was 
wavering. Should he vote for the Georgian, New York's unit-vote 
ballot, for want of a majority, would not be counted. For this 
reason, Clay and Daniel Webster spent several hours with Van 
Rensselaer that morning, urging him to vote for Adams. Still in 
doubt when he took his seat, the elderly patroon bowed his head in 
prayer for divine guidance . When he opened his eyes he saw a 
ballot on the floor with Adams's name on it. Accepting this as an 
answer to his prayer, he picked it up and dropped it in the box. 
This decided the vote of New York, and with it the election of the 
sixth president of the United States . "The long agony," Clay wrote, 
was over. 28 
But Clay's agony was really just beginning. Three days after his 
election Adams offered him the state department, and Clay took it 
under consideration. The offer was not altogether a surprise to him. 
Three weeks earlier, the day before he announced for Adams, Clay 
wrote his brother-in-law that he believed he could have "any 
situation [in Adams's cabinet] that I may please." This belief was 
formed, he said, "from circumstances not [from] assurances to 
which I should not listen, but which I should instantly check if 
attempted to be made." Still , he was indifferent to accepting the 
job, having, he said, "an unaffected repugnance to any Executive 
employment. "29 
When the offer came, however, Clay sought advice from his 
friends, as well he might, since a storm of malignant abuse was 
already descending upon him and Adams. With the announcement 
of Clay's intention to vote for Adams, the friends of Jackson, 
Crawford, and even of Calhoun, had turned their wrath upon him. 
Especially convincing to them that there had been a "corrupt 
bargain" between Clay and Adams was the clumsy, naive conduct 
of James Buchanan, the future president, then a young congressman 
from Pennsylvania . 
A friend and admirer of both Clay and Jackson, Bu~hanan 
hoped to see Jackson as President and Clay as his secretary of state. 
Acting on his own initiative, without Jackson's knowledge, he had 
called upon Clay and Letcher and assured them that if Jackson were 
elected with their help he would offer Clay the first place in his 
cabinet, that of secretary of state. Receiving no response from 
21 HENRY CLAY 
them, he next called on Jackson and told him that if he would only 
let it be known that Clay would be in his cabinet he could count on 
Clay's influence to elect him. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
both Clay and Jackson separately concluded that Buchanan was the 
agent of the other in bringing overtures of a possible bargain. 30 
Meantime, a sensation had erupted on 28 January 1825, when an 
anonymous letter, published first in the Washington Columbian 
Observer, and later throughout the land, charged that Clay had 
agreed to sell his vote in exchange for the state department. Clay 
met this accusation with a card in the Washington Daily National 
Intelligencer branding the author as "a base and infamous 
calumniator, a dastard and a liar," and calling on him to reveal 
himself and assume the responsibility of a man of honor. Clay also 
requested an official investigation of the charge by the House of 
Representatives. . 
The affair took a ludicrous turn, however, when George Kremer, 
semiliterate and buffoonish congressman from Pennsylvania, 
claimed authorship of the letter. It was patent that Kremer could 
not have composed such a letter and that he was merely the tool of 
another. Kremer added to the confusion when, during the House 
investigation, he denied that he intended to charge Clay with 
corruption or dishonor and said that he held Clay in the highest 
regard. Subsequently, he admitted that he did not write the letter 
and was not acquainted with its contents, nor did he comprehend 
its import when he signed it. Clay then charged Jackson's crony, 
John Eaton, with the authorship and called on him to affirm or 
deny the charge. Eaton would do neither. 31 
Throughout the Kremer crisis, Clay's friends were giving him 
conflicting advice as to whether he should accept Adams's offer of 
the state department. Some advised him to refuse it on the ground 
that acceptance would be considered "as conclusive evidence" of the 
charges Kremer was making against him. 
But others pointed out that no matter what he did he would be 
criticized. If he declined the post it would be said that "the patriotic 
Mr. Kremer, by an exposure of the corrupt arrangement, had 
prevented its consummation ." It was also argued that no matter 
which candidate had been elected, Clay would probably have been 
offered the state department, for it would have been difficult for the 
winner to form a strong administration without him. Further, he 
was told that having made Adams the sixth president, a refusal to 
go into his cabinet would be a vote of no confidence in him. 
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Finally, he was assured that he owed it to Kentucky and to the 
West to accept the offer. Clay considered these several arguments 
persuasive, and he consented to appointment as secretary of state. 32 
It was a fateful decision, one Clay later admitted was unwise. 
For in spite of his disclaimers of innocence and his denials that he 
had entered cabals or secret conclaves, the charge that he had sold 
his vote and influence to Adams in exchange for the state 
department would not die. It would arise again and again to haunt 
him throughout his long career . 
The consequences flowing from the decision remain incalculable, 
both in its effect on Clay's political career and on the history of the 
nation . Probably more than any other factor, it would foredoom 
Clay's repeated attempt to win the presidency. Had he been elected 
president in 1844, for instance, when he had his greatest 
opportunity, it is most unlikely that there would have been a war 
with Mexico. If there had been no Mexican War, many of the 
burning issues centered around the expansion of slavery might 
never have arisen; perhaps the Civil War could have been 
postponed or even avoided. But these are idle speculations of what 
might have been, ground too uncertain and treacherous for a 
historian to tread. An assessment of the changed political behavior 
flowing directly from the bizarre election of 1824 offers firmer 
footing . 
. It has already been noted that out of this canvass came a change 
in the nominating process. Never again would presidential 
candidates be nominated by a congressional caucus. Criticized as 
outdated, undemocratic, and out of tune with the spirit of the 
times, as manifested by growing demands of the "common man" 
for a more direct role in the selection of presidential candidates, the 
caucus would not survive its choice of the physically incapacitated 
Crawford in 1824. In 1832 would begin the national nominating 
convention. 
But more fundamental than the change in the nominating process 
would be the political realignment resulting from the fateful election 
conducted by the House of Representatives on 9 February 1825. For 
the very nature of the decision that had to be made there by Clay 
led inevitably to new divisions and tensions. Even had Jackson and 
his friends not believed the charges of "corrupt bargain" they 
broadcast against Clay and Adams, the partisan advantages to be 
reaped from the sowing of them were such as to make the 
temptation to use them all but irresistible. 
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As a result of these charges and the bitterness they engendered, 
the Jacksonians would build a new political party fashioned around 
the image of a military chieftain turned commoner and democrat. 
In spite of his unfamiliarity with almost all facets of public 
administration-banking, finance , taxation, foreign affairs-he 
would come to display a canny, almost intuitive ability to discern 
the aspirations of commoners, to place himself at the head of 
popular causes, and to win the masses to his programs and policies. 
A great political party, the Democratic party, would be formed 
about the father image he projected. It would be dedicated at first 
to the immediate goal of "throwing out the rascals," chiefly 
President Adams and Henry Clay, his "corrupt" secretary of state. 
This objective would be attained in 1828. But the Jackson party 
would long survive the winning of this limited goal. It would 
develop an organization with a tenacious loyalty to the welfare of 
the common man that would carry it through many a stormy 
passage in American history. 
In opposition to it developed a rival party made up of all the 
disparate elements hostile fo the Jackson Democrats. Clay would 
leave office in March 1829, never again to play an administrative 
role in government. But in the remaining quarter-century in which 
he would continue his career as a magnetic legislative leader, he 
would rally around him all of Jackson's personal and ideological 
enemies. As the leader of this opposition, Henry Clay would 
become one of the founders of the great Whig party . 
The Whigs would never be so closely united as were the 
Democrats. The varied elements that composed their party had 
conflicting interests that would seal its doom a few years after the 
death of its great leader in 1852. But while he lived, Clay gave it an 
elan and an esprit de corps that enabled it to hold together despite 
his sometimes high-handed, even arrogant, behavior in guiding its 
destinies. The party certainly attracted men of great talent, and it 
would serve the country well during the two decades of its 
existence. 
Thus, in these several ways, the election of 1824 wrought 
profound changes in American political history. Ironically, 
however, nowhere were these changes focused on repealing or 
adjusting the root cause of all the confusion-the anomaly that is 
the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 
an anomaly which permits Congress to elect a president. 
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